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Recent evidence has renewed views on the size of fiscal multipliers. It is
notably emphasized that fiscal multipliers are higher in times of crisis. Starting
from this literature, we develop a simple and tractable model to deal with the
fiscal strategy led by euro area countries. Constrained by fiscal rules and by spec-
ulative attacks in financial markets, euro area members have adopted restrictive
fiscal policies despite strong negative output gaps. Based on the model, we
present simulations to determine the path of public debt given the current
expected consolidation. Our simulations suggest that despite strong austerity
measures, not all countries would be able to reach the 60% debt-to-GDP. If fiscal
multipliers vary along the business cycle, this would give a strong case for
delaying austerity. This alternative scenario is considered. Our results show not
only that delaying austerity would improve growth perspectives and would not
be incompatible with public debt converging to 60% of GDP.
Keywords: public debt, fiscal multipliers, growth
Between the late 1970s and the outbreak of the global finan-
cial crisis, many economists and policymakers denied fiscal policy
a role in stabilising output. After a long period of fiscal (or
Keynesian) dominance in Western economies, until stagflation
arose in the 1970s, monetary policy was finally considered as the
most effective and flexible tool to dampen business cycle in the
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short run while achieving price stability in the medium term.1
Except under exceptional circumstances (the case of a liquidity
trap), the consensus seemed to be that fiscal multipliers were low
(i.e. below unity). Some empirical papers even argued that expan-
sionary fiscal consolidation might occur when fiscal restriction was
mainly based on expenditures cuts rather than on tax increases
(Alesina and Perotti, 1996, Perotti 1996 or Afonso, 2010).2
Although these views were partly reversed in 2009 when the finan-
cial turmoil led industrial countries in the deepest recession since
the Great Depression, the Keynesian revival rapidly faded away.
European countries reversed their fiscal policy stance in 2010-2011
and engaged in fiscal contraction although output gaps were still
strongly negative. Austerity measures were first implemented in
Spain, Ireland and Greece. They followed the outbreak of the Greek
crisis and were fueled by fears of a possible sovereign default. Since
2011, austerity has been generalised in most euro area countries. As
shown by De Grauwe and Ji (2013), austerity programmes were
partly driven and intensified by financial market pressures. Until
recently, the economic models used by the European Commission
relied on the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis assigning only a
minor role to fiscal policy. Despite growing literature emphasizing
that fiscal multipliers may not be low, the European Commission
forecasts clearly illustrated the view that consolidation would not
be very costly or, if it were, only temporarily.3
Besides, existing fiscal rules constrained the use of fiscal policy.
The 3% of GDP deficit ceiling for public deficit was breached in
2009 under what was deemed to be exceptional circumstances. But
in 2010, almost all euro area economies started to recover and the
European Commission decided to launch excessive deficit proce-
dures. Consolidation was then endorsed by the European
Commission and approved by the Council. Although early fears of
1. See Allsopp and Vines (2005) or Angeriz and Arestis (2009) for a detailed description and
criticism of this “consensus”.
2. This view was however debated notably by, e.g., Creel et al. (2005).
3. Resorting to a narrative approach, IMF (2010) challenged the view that fiscal consolidation
might be expansionary and found multipliers significantly above unity. De Cos and Moral-
Benito (2013) argue that estimates of the real effects of pure fiscal contractions, when
endogeneity issues have been rigorously corrected for, point to negative figures. Finally,
Christodoulakis (2013) reviews the real costs of fiscal contraction in Greece and pledges for a
slowdown in fiscal retrenchment. 
Fiscal consolidation in times of crisis: Is the sooner really the better? 161
a possible double-dip were expressed (e.g. OFCE, 2011), the
strategy of synchronized front-loading austerity was amplified in
2012 and 2013. 
The efficiency of such a strategy was debated. It regained
momentum with new views on the size of fiscal multipliers and
was reinforced by disappointing performance of the euro area. The
literature which has re-emerged since 2009 reached two main
conclusions:
1. The multiplier is higher in “times of crisis” (in the short term
or as long as the crisis lasts).4 “Times of crisis” mean periods of
high unemployment and/or wide output gap. Another symptom
may be a situation where safe long-term interest rates are very low
(i.e. negative in real terms), suggesting a flight to safety (radical
uncertainty) or a liquidity trap (expectations of deflation). Two
theoretical interpretations are consistent with these manifestations
of the crisis. Firstly, price expectations are moving toward defla-
tion, or radical uncertainty makes it impossible to form an
expectation, which is consistent with very low safe interest rates
and leads to the paralysis of monetary policy. Or secondly, more
economic agents (households, firms) are subject to short-term
liquidity constraints, perpetuating the recessionary spiral and
preventing monetary policy from functioning. In one case or
another, fiscal multipliers are higher than in normal times because
the expansionary fiscal policy (resp. restrictive) forces the
economic agents to take on debt (resp. shed debt) collectively
instead of individually.
2. The multiplier is higher for expenditures than for taxes. The
argument in normal times is that higher taxes act as a disincentive
whereas spending cuts act as an incentive on labour supply. In a
small open economy, when monetary policy also induces real
currency depreciation, fiscal contraction can increase activity, a
result advocated by supporters of fiscal discipline. But in times of
crisis, in addition to the fact that multipliers are high, the logic
applicable in normal circumstances is reversed. The reluctant use
of taxes, because of disincentive effects, and the preferred spending
cuts do not produce the expected effects in an economy with
4. Parker (2011) recalls that this view dates back, at least, to Keynes “General theory” and he
calls it the “(old) Keynesian view”.
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involuntary unemployment or overcapacity. It is in fact the expec-
tations of a recession or of deflation that act as disincentives,
which is another factor behind high multipliers.
Starting from this literature, it clearly appears that front-loaded
austerity can be an ill-designed strategy. The economic and social
costs can indeed be very high. It logically calls for an alternative
strategy where it would be optimal to delay consolidation until
economic growth has resumed. Implementing austerity measures
when the output gap is close to zero may reduce consolidation
costs and may also mitigate the requirements for a negative fiscal
stance since all or part of the deficit would be already reduced
thanks to automatic stabilizers. 
The aim of this paper is first to assess the impact of fiscal consol-
idation on European economies. To this end, we present the results
from simulations based on a simple reduced-form model repre-
senting 11 euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain). The model takes into account the most recent evidence on
the size of fiscal multipliers. We adopt a flexible approach where
the fiscal multiplier varies according to the business cycle. By
doing so, we do not only highlight the costs of implementing
austerity when the output gap is negative but we also seek for alter-
native and less costly strategies to reduce public debt. We define a
simple algorithm to search the optimal dynamic fiscal stance in
order to minimise the cost of austerity while seeking to reach a
60% debt-to-GDP ratio in 2032, in accordance with existing fiscal
rules in the euro area.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the first section,
we review the literature on the fiscal multiplier. The main features
of the model, which is used for simulations, are presented in the
second section. The third section analyses the actual path of
consolidation and shows that it is ill-designed. Finally, the fifth
section analyses and discusses the consequences of delaying fiscal
contraction.
1. Fiscal multiplier in times of crisis: a short overview
During the Great Recession, most industrial countries have
implemented fiscal stimulus packages aiming at stabilising the
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business cycle. But the fiscal stance was then rapidly reversed with
most EMU countries rapidly engaging in a fiscal consolidation
strategy. Therefore, the instrument of fiscal policy has been used
intensively since the onset of the crisis. This naturally raises the
issue of the efficiency of fiscal policy; hence, it questions the value
of fiscal multipliers which lay at the heart of the assessment of the
output costs or benefits of consolidation. 
An abundant literature has recently discussed not only the
value but also the stability of fiscal multipliers.5 Economists from
the IMF (IMF, 2012; Blanchard and Leigh, 2013) recognized that
their hypothesis on the value of fiscal multipliers were certainly
underestimated, which explained why the economic forecasts
during the 2008 crisis often turned wrong. Their reassessment
showed that fiscal multipliers have ranged from 0.9 to 1.7 since the
Great Recession. Having values above unity indicates clearly that
fiscal consolidation is costly. As a consequence, a gradual and
smooth fiscal consolidation process is certainly preferable to a
strategy of fast and sharp reduction of public imbalances. The size
of the fiscal multiplier appears a crucial issue in the current
context. Moreover, a recent literature has highlighted that this size
is path-dependent, as well as instrument-dependent (see Parker,
2011, for a survey of measurement issues and Michaillat, 2012, for
a theoretical rationale).
Corsetti, Meier and Müller (2012) explain that in “times of
crisis” more and more economic agents (households, firms) are
subject to very short-term liquidity constraints, thus maintaining
the recessionary spiral and preventing monetary policy from func-
tioning. The value of the multiplier may reach 2 in times of crisis
whereas it is supposed to be closer to 0.5 in normal times. Auer-
bach and Gorodnichenko (2012), corroborate the idea that the
multipliers are higher in recessions than in periods of expansion.
These authors argue that the impact of a shock on public expendi-
ture would be 4 times higher when implemented during an
economic downturn (2.5) than in an upturn (0.6). This result has
been confirmed for the US data by Fazzari et al. (2012) and by
Mittnik and Semmler (2012), but Owyang et al. (2013) do not find
such evidence with a dataset encompassing the entire 20th
5. Some parts of this literature review draw on Heyer (2012).
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century.6 This non-linearity was also found with German data by
Baum and Koester (2011) and conceptualized by Creel, Heyer and
Plane (2011) in a simulated model drawing on French data. Karras
(2013), studying a panel of 61 countries, both developed and
developing, between 1952 and 2007, concludes that the fiscal
multiplier is twice as large during downswings than expansions. 
The stance of monetary policy also matters. Hall (2009)
concludes that the size of the multiplier doubles and is around 1.7
when the real interest rate is close to zero (zero lower bound),
which is characteristic of an economy undergoing a downturn, as is
the case today in many developed countries. This view is shared by
a number of other researchers, including DeLong and Summers
(2012), Erceg and Lindé (2012), OECD (2009), and Boussard et al.
(2012). It was also highlighted in some recent theoretical work,
notably by Carrillo and Poilly (2013), Christiano et al. (2011),
Woodford (2011). When nominal interest rates are blocked at the
zero lower bound, anticipated real interest rates rise. Monetary
policy can no longer offset budgetary restrictions and can even
become restrictive, especially when price expectations are anchored
on deflation.
Coenen et al. (2012) analyse the instrument-dependence of the
effectiveness of fiscal policy. On the basis of 8 different macroeco-
nometric models (mainly DSGE models) for the United States, and
4 models for the euro area, they show that the size of many multi-
pliers is large, particularly if public expenditures and targeted
transfers are used. The multiplier effects exceed unity if the
strategy focuses on public consumption or transfers targeted to
specific agents and are larger than 1.5 for public investment. For
the other instruments, the effects are still positive but range from
0.2 for corporation tax to 0.7 for consumer taxes. This finding is
also shared by the European Commission (2012), which indicates
that the fiscal multiplier is larger if fiscal consolidation is based on
public expenditure, and in particular on public investment. These
results confirm those published about fiscal stimulus by the
OECD (2009), Creel et al. (2009), Burriel et al. (2010), and Baum
and Koester (2011). Without invalidating this result, a study by
Fazzari et al. (2012) nevertheless introduced a nuance: according to
6. Owyang et al. (2013) find some above-unity fiscal multipliers only for Canada. 
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their work, the multiplier associated with public spending is much
higher than that observed for taxes only when the economy is at
the bottom of the cycle. This result would be reversed if the
economy were closer to full-employment.
Furthermore, in their specific assessment of the US economy,
Ilzetzki et al. (2013), highlight a high value for the fiscal multiplier
for public investment (1.7), i.e. higher than for public consump-
tion.7 This is similar to the results of Freedman et al. (2009).
In the recent literature, only a few papers seem to break the
consensus among economists on the size of fiscal multipliers. For
instance, after examining 107 fiscal consolidation plans,
conducted in 21 OECD countries over 1970-2007, Alesina and
Ardagna (2010) and Alesina et al. (2012) conclude, first, that the
multipliers can be negative and, second, that fiscal consolidations
based on expenditure are associated with minor, short-lived reces-
sions, while consolidations based on taxation are associated with
deeper, more protracted recessions. These findings raise two
critiques. First, Alesina et al. (2012) usually emphasize rather
substantially the experiences of fiscal restraint of some Scandina-
vian countries or Canada which are highly specific (planned entry
into the European monetary system and financial liberalisation in
Scandinavian countries, unexpected increases in oil and gas
receipts for Canada) and cannot be easily generalized. By the way,
when these experiences are included within a larger dataset
including all experiences of fiscal restriction (or expansion), no
strong results emerge. Second, the empirical work of Alesina et al.
(2012) suffers from an endogeneity problem in the measurement
of fiscal restraint. Once De Cos and Moral-Benito (2013) correct for
this problem, fiscal contractions give… contractionary effects. The
notion of a narrative record of fiscal impulse also helps to avoid
this endogeneity. For example, in the case of a real estate bubble
(and more generally in cases of large capital gains), the additional
tax revenues from real estate transactions result in a reduction in
the structural deficit, as these revenues are not cyclically-based (the
elasticity of revenues to GDP becomes much higher than 1). So
7. Ilzetzki et al. (2013) also show, using VAR estimates performed with a dataset of 44
countries, that the effectiveness of fiscal policy depends on the exchange rate regime, quite
consistently with the properties derived from Mundell-Fleming models. 
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these revenues are associated with an expansion (in conjunction
with the housing bubble) and with a reduction in the structural
deficit: thus, it strengthens artificially the argument that reducing
the public deficit may lead to an increase in activity, whereas the
causality is actually the reverse.
Beyond Alesina et al.’s contributions, Corsetti et al. (2013a,
2013b) have studied the incidence of public debt growth (and
possible sovereign defaults) on the fiscal multiplier. Through the
“sovereign risk channel”, fiscal multipliers would tend to be
smaller when sovereign risk (or public debt) is high than other-
wise.8 Müller (2013) draws on this argument to oppose the self-
defeating approach that Gros and Maurer (2012) and Holland and
Portes (2012) attributed to current European fiscal austerity. Denes
et al. (2013) and Bi et al. (2013) rather oppose Corsetti et al.’s
conclusions. The former attribute the effectiveness of fiscal policy
to a clear management of public finances in the short, medium
and long run: the success of a fiscal stimulus is dependent on the
policy regime and on the confidence by the public that a change in
the policy regime would lead the fiscal stance to change as well.
The latter share a similar view, although they broaden the determi-
nants of a successful fiscal consolidation to the public debt level, to
fiscal consolidation duration, likelihood and composition. 
Apart from the contributions by Alesina, Corsetti and their
colleagues, a relatively broad consensus has emerged: a policy of
fiscal restraint is preferable in periods of expansion, but is ineffec-
tive and even pernicious when the economy is at a standstill; if such
a policy were to be enacted during a downturn, then tax increases
would be less harmful to activity than public spending cuts.
Taking these views into consideration is crucial to assess fiscal
consolidation episodes: The higher the value of the multiplier, the
costlier is fiscal consolidation. Such an assessment should rely on a
careful analysis of the economic, financial and monetary context.
Looking at the situation of euro area economies in 2012 certainly
gives credit to the hypothesis of a high multiplier. Monetary policy
rates have indeed rapidly decreased to the zero lower bound. The
unemployment rate has reached record levels in the euro area. For
8. Using a dataset of EU-26 countries, Vranceanu and Besancenot (2013) find empirical results
in line with Corsetti et al’s analysis.
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all countries but Germany, it stands well above estimated NAIRUs.
It is not always easy to disentangle between countries resorting to
consolidation based on expenditures cuts or tax increases. Finally,
the synchronization of fiscal consolidation across countries may
also certainly tend to raise the value of the multiplier.
This hypothesis is confirmed when taking together 2011 and
2012, years of very strong fiscal impulses. Figure 1 compares, on
the one hand, changes in the output gap from end 2010 to 2012
(on the x-axis) and, on the other hand, the cumulative fiscal
impulse for 2011 and 2012 (y-axis), based on OECD Economic
Outlook data. We obtain the short-term impact of fiscal consolida-
tion. Figure 1 depicts this relationship, showing a close link
between fiscal restraint and economic slowdown.
For most countries, the “apparent” multiplier is less than 1 (the
lines connecting each of the bubbles are below the bisector, the
“apparent” multiplier is the inverse of the slope of these lines).
Figure 2 refines the assessment. The changes in the output gap are
corrected for the “autonomous” dynamic of the closing of the
output gap (if there had been no impulse, there would have been a
Figure 1. Fiscal impulses 2011-2012 and changes in the output gaps
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook 91, June 2012. The year 2012 is a projection (OFCE forecast October 2012). The
area of the bubbles is proportional to real GDP in 2011 ($ PPP).
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closing of the output gap, which is estimated as taking place at the
same rate as in the past) and for the impact of each country’s
budget cutbacks on the other partners through the channel of
foreign trade. The bubbles in this chart therefore replace the
bubbles in Figure 1, integrating these two opposing effects, which
are evaluated here while seeking to minimize the value of the
multipliers. In particular, because the output gaps had never been
so large, it may be the case that they are closing faster than in the
past 30 or 40 years, which would justify a more dynamic counter-
factual and therefore higher fiscal multipliers.
Austria and Germany are exceptions. As these two countries
enjoy a more favourable economic situation (lower unemploy-
ment, better business conditions), it is not surprising that the
multiplier is low there. Despite this, the “corrected apparent”
multiplier is negative. This follows either from the paradoxical
effects of the incentives, or more likely from the fact that monetary
policy is more effective and that these two countries have escaped
the liquidity trap. But the correction provided here does not take
into account any stimulus from monetary policy.
In the United States, the “2011-2012 corrected apparent” multi-
plier reaches 1. This “corrected apparent” multiplier is very high in
Greece (~ 1.5), Spain (~ 1.3) and Portugal (~ 1.2). This suggests that
if the economic situation deteriorates further, the value of the
multiplier may increase, exacerbating the vicious circle of austerity.
For the euro area as a whole, the “corrected apparent” multi-
plier results from the aggregation of “small open economies”. It is
thus higher than the multiplier in each country, because it relates
the impact of fiscal policy in each country to the whole area and
not only to the country concerned. The aggregate multiplier for
the euro area also depends on the composition of the austerity
packages, and more especially on the countries where the measures
are being implemented. However, the biggest negative fiscal
impulses take place in areas where the multipliers are highest or in
the countries in deepest crisis. The result is that the aggregate
multiplier for the euro area is 1.3, significantly higher than the
multiplier derived for the US.
A comparison of the fiscal plans for 2011 and 2012 with the
economic cycle in those years yields a high estimate for the fiscal
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multipliers. This confirms the dependence of the multiplier on the
cycle and is a serious argument against the austerity approach.  
2. Short description of the model and calibration
The simulations are done with a macroeconomic model that
combines structural and reduced-form non-linear equations. An
exhaustive presentation of the model and its calibration is avail-
able in the appendix of iAGS 2013 Report.9 It is a simple reduced-
form equation model to analyse complex supply and demand
mechanisms that can be heterogeneous across countries. In
contrast with DSGE models which are linearised around a single
equilibrium, our model notably allows for variable fiscal multi-
pliers over the business cycle. Indeed, the value of the fiscal
multiplier is endogenous and determined according to the size of
the output gap. The parameters of the model are calibrated to allow
the analyses of various scenarios. It is far more tractable than DSGE
models and given the current context, it may better capture the
Figure 2. Fiscal impulse 2011-2012 and adjusted changes in the output gap
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook 91, June 2012. The year 2012 is a projection (OFCE forecast October 2012). The
area of the bubbles is proportional to real GDP in 2011 ($ PPP).
9. http://www.iags-project.org/documents/iags_appendix2013.pdf. 
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effect of fiscal policy on the output gap. It does not rest on struc-
tural hypotheses regarding agents’ behaviour (representative
rational agent), hypotheses which are today largely debated.10 By
the way, it may be more consistent with recent empirical develop-
ments regarding the size of fiscal multipliers. It enables to reflect
more accurately the current economic situation which may be
better described by a Keynesian environment. Yet, the model is
also sufficiently tractable to allow for alternative hypotheses. It is
easy to modify the parameters defining the fiscal multiplier and to
account for New Classical hypotheses where fiscal policy has only
a limited impact on output. Hence, this kind of model is helpful to
shed some lights on the effects of various economic policy shocks
according to a given set of transparent hypotheses. 
The key features of the model are the following: 
— It allows for an explicit representation of the main euro area
countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. An
aggregated euro area is also computed.
— On the demand side, an open economy aggregate demand
function is represented, with fiscal and monetary policy,
external demand (a channel for intra EU interdependencies)
as well as exogenous shocks on the output gap (the gap
between actual and potential GDP). The equation is written
as an error-correction model. It may also take into account
possible long run effects of macroeconomic policies such as
long term fiscal policy, debt-related threshold effects and
hysteresis on potential output. The stabilization of the
economy stems from adjustments in the long-term interest
rates and competitiveness, which have feedback effects on
the output gap. The stabilisation may then hinge on private
demand (through interest rates adjustment and monetary
policy) and on external demand (through the decrease in
relative prices). The calibration allows to simulate standard
hypotheses as well as alternatives, checking the dependence
of results on different sets of hypotheses. Furthermore, the
size of fiscal multipliers is allowed to vary along the business
10. These issues are notably discussed by Fagiolo and Roventini (2012).
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cycle. The ineffectiveness of monetary policy is made
possible when the economy hits the zero lower bound (ZLB). 
— External demand is modelled using a bilateral trade matrix
representing interdependencies between countries. The
trade matrix is also used as a basis for imbalances analysis. 
— We model prices by a generalized Phillips curve relating
current and expected inflation to the output gap, imported
inflation and other exogenous shocks. Expectations can be
modelled as adaptive (backward-looking) or rational
(forward-looking).
— A Taylor rule sums up monetary policy, except under the
zero lower bound. 
— Changes in the short term monetary policy rate are then
passed through the long-term interest rates. Hence,
according to the expectations theory, the long-term interest
rate for German public bonds is set equal to the expected
sum of future short term interest rates (Shiller, 1979), with
short-term interest rates set by the (European) central bank.
The long-term public rate for Germany is considered risk
free, and long-term public rates for other countries include a
risk premium that is set exogenously. We also temporarily
set exogenously the long-term rate for countries that entered
the EFSF to account for a lower interest rate on debt refi-
nancing. Finally, for each country the long-term interest rate
on private bonds is equal to the public one plus a risk
premium that is set exogenously.
— The stance of monetary policy remains expansionary as long
as the euro area aggregate output gap is negative and if infla-
tion is below the 2% target. In case of a negative idiosyncratic
demand shock, the convergence to the potential growth rate
hinges partly on the effect of common expansionary mone-
tary and on a competitiveness effect. Due to hysteresis effect,
the output level may be permanently affected by a negative
demand shock. But trend growth will always converge to an
exogenously set path. The hypothesis regarding long run
growth rates are presented in table A1 in the appendix.
— We call ~yc , the gap between the log of real GDP Y of country
c, and a baseline trajectory for the output growing at a
constant growth rate. A distinction is then made between
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potential GDP and this baseline. This gap is noted y*c . Then,
yc  is the output gap of country c, i.e. the difference
between ~yc  and y*c . The real GDP growth rate is given by
potential GDP growth and the output gap.
— The public balance separates interest payments, cyclically-
adjusted balance and cyclical components, in order to prop-
erly assess the fiscal stance, i.e. the part of fiscal policy which
is under the direct control (discretion) of current govern-
ments. We then derive public debt projections for euro area
countries.
 The structural primary surplus evolves according to the fiscal
impulse (which is set exogenously, at levels given by Stability
programmes, except otherwise stated) and to changes in taxes due
to variations in the gap between potential output and the baseline.
A permanent downward shift in potential output relative to the
baseline entails a permanent fall in taxes, hence a permanent fall
in the structural primary surplus. The average interest rate on debt
varies according to the long-term nominal interest rate on newly
issued public bonds. The average maturity of public debt is
assumed to be constant. The inverse of average maturity gives the
share of debt refinanced every year. Public debt (in % of nominal
GDP) varies according to its usual law of motion. 
We introduce a state-dependent fiscal multiplier, in accordance
with the consensus mentioned in the former section of the paper.
The fiscal multiplier μt is modelled as follows:
The value of the multiplier is maximal in very bad times,
whereas it is minimal in very good times (see Figure 3). We define
normal times as economic states in which the output gap stands
between -1.5% and 1.5%. In that case, we set the ex ante instanta-
neous fiscal multiplier to 0.5 for large countries (Germany, France,
Italy and Spain), and to 0.3 for other countries, accounting for the
fact that fiscal multipliers are generally smaller for small open
If  then   
if  then  
if  then  
if  then ⁄ ∗  
if  then ⁄ ∗  
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economies than for large countries (Ilzetsky et al., 2013). When the
output gap is larger than 1.5%, the ex ante instantaneous fiscal
multiplier linearly decreases down to 0 when the output gap
reaches 6%. In bad times, the ex ante instantaneous fiscal multiplier
increases as the output gap deteriorates. We set its maximum value
between 1 and 1.3 when the output gap reaches -6% (Table 1).  
Drawing on exogenous fiscal impulses, we compute an effective
fiscal impulse, representing the ex ante11 cumulative real effect of
current and past fiscal impulses at time t. We retain 7 lags to
account for the possibility of long lasting effects of fiscal impulses
Table 1. Fiscal multipliers
DEU FRA ITA ESP NLD BEL GRC PRT IRL AUT FIN
Fiscal multiplier µ0 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.5
Maximum multiplier 
µmax
1.0 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Figure 3. Example of the value of the multiplier according to the output gap
Note: μmax = 1.3, μ0 = 0.5, μmin = 0, ymin = -6%, yinf = -1.5%, ysup = 1.5% and ymax = 6%. Values are illustrative and
may vary across countries.
Source: Authors’ estimates.
11. It is an ex ante multiplier in the sense that it does not take into account monetary policy
effects and external trade feedback effects on GDP following a fiscal impulse.
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(Figure 4). With ψk.μt-k, the fiscal multiplier at time t of a fiscal
impulse that occurred k years ago, we can write:
Equation (1) ensures that the fiscal impulse impact depends on
the fiscal multiplier which prevailed when the fiscal impulse
occurred. We also assume that EFI can take into account long run
effects of fiscal policy. It is the case if ψα = Σ7k=0 ψk ≠ 0, since in that
case EFI is not necessarily null in the long run. The long run impact
of a sequence of fiscal impulses is then computed using the accu-
mulation of fiscal impulses times the multiplier (Equation (2)); the
long run impact on potential GDP is: μα.ΣFIt .
3. The costs of fiscal consolidation
We use our model to simulate the path of output gap and
public debt according to the consolidation plans. The aim is
twofold. First, we assess the cost of consolidation, in terms of the
Figure 4. Effective fiscal impulse in normal times with μt = 0.5 following a positive 
fiscal impulse
 1% of GDP
Source: Authors’ estimates.
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output gap. The maximum negative value for the output gap as
well as the time needed for output gaps to get back to zero provide
insights on the consequences of austerity. Second, as the aim of
implemented consolidation measures is to bring back the debt-to-
GDP ratio to 60% by 2032, which is the horizon of the 1/20th debt
rule incorporated in the revised SGP and in the Fiscal Compact, we
pay attention to the ability of member states to reach this target,
and to comply with existing fiscal rules. A full discussion on the
rationale of this objective goes beyond the scope of this paper. It is
indeed not clear that there is a need for some or most euro area
countries to consolidate. A significant part of the deficit may be
cyclical. Besides, it must be stressed that it does not match any
theoretical definition of fiscal sustainability12 nor does it corre-
spond to the equilibrium value for public debt. This may only be
seen as an institutional objective that euro area members have to
comply with.
The first six columns of Table 2 report the public debt and the
structural balance respectively in 2012, 2017 (5-year horizon) and
2032 (20-year horizon). The cumulated fiscal impulse for 2013-2015
sums up the short-term fiscal stance in the euro area as it cumulates
forecast variations in structural primary government spending and
taxes.13 We report the average annual growth rate of real GDP for
2013-2017 and 2018-2032, and the sovereign interest rate spread
vis-à-vis Germany in 2013-2015. A description of the main under-
lying hypotheses is given in the Appendix.
Table 2 reports how tough austerity will be all over the euro
area: between 2013 and 2015, all member states except Germany
and Finland will improve their cyclically-adjusted primary public
deficit by at least 2% of GDP. Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece
will make even stronger efforts. This highly contractionary fiscal
stance will make it ever harder to achieve an output gap at or above
12. The issue of public debt sustainability is theoretically and empirically unsettled, between
promoters of investigating the statistical properties of public finances' variables on the one
hand, and, on the other hand, promoters of investigating the macroeconomic incidence of
public finances (Bohn, 2007, calls it “a return to economic thinking”). Stated briefly,
sustainability refers to the ability of the general government to pay back the domestic public
debt. This ability depends on the future available scope for spending cuts and tax hikes, but also
on future economic growth.
13. Government spending is net of interest payments and spending and taxes are adjusted for
cyclical variations. 
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zero in our simulations: countries will not fully recover from the
crisis until 2019 (Austria, Finland), 2020 (Germany, France, Italy,
Spain, Portugal) or 2021. Meanwhile, the aggregate euro area
output gap will reach -4.8%. Hence, the cumulated fiscal impulse,
starting already from negative output gaps and associated large
fiscal multiplier effects, will lead to gloomy growth prospects for
the euro area. Germany and Austria will be exceptions, since they
will face almost no further real cost with their forecast fiscal
strategy thanks to milder consolidation plans. 
Regarding public debt-to-GDP ratios in 2032, the simulations
suggest that even though some countries (Spain, Portugal, Ireland
and Greece) do not reach the 60% threshold, debt ratios are
substantially lowered. For instance, Greece would halve its debt
ratio and Ireland's debt would decrease by 35 percentage points of
GDP between 2017 and 2032. Nevertheless, the social costs as well
Table 2. Baseline scenario
Public debt
 (% of GDP)
Structural balance
(% of GDP)
Cumu-
lated fiscal 
impulse
(% of 
GDP)
Average 
annual 
growth
Maxi-
mum 
negative 
output 
gap 
reached
Sove-
reign 
rate 
spread to 
Germany
2012 2017 2032 2012 2017 2032 2013-2015
2013-
2017
2018-
2032
2013- 
2032
2013-
2015
Germany 82 67 26 0.3 0.9 1.8 -0.3 1.4 1.3 -0.7 0.0
France 90 91 52 -1.4 -0,2 0,2 -2.9 1,9 2.2 -6.8 0.0
Italy 127 109 18 0.3 2.4 5.5 -2.1  1.6 1.4 -6.5 0.7
Spain 86 101 83 -3.7 -2.1 -2.2 -4.3  1.7 2.3 -9.7 0.8
Netherlands 69 68 48 -2.9 -0.8 -0.8 -2.9 2.0 2.1 -2.8 0.0
Belgium 100 91 38 -0.9 0.6 1.8 -2.2  2.1 2.1 -4.3 0.2
Portugal 119 133 79 -2.8 -0.8 0.7 -4.7  0.9 1.8 -10.1 1.2
Ireland 118 140 105 -5.0 -2.4 -2.3 -5.7  1.0 2.6 -10.9 1.0
Greece 177 199 93 -0.6 1.3 3.0 -7.5 0.2 2.5 -17.1 1.1
Finland  53 45 8 0.2 0.1 1.9 -1.3 2.4 2.2 -1.9 0.0
Austria  75 68 40 -2.5 -0.3 0.3 -1.9 1.7 1.6 -0.9 0.0
Euro area  94 88 43 -1.0 0.3 1.2 -2.2 1.6 1.8 -4.8 0.3
Sources: Eurostat, iAGS model.
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as the cost in terms of fiscal balance could make this adjustment
unrealistic. Christodoulakis (2013) shows that fiscal austerity in
Greece has been self-defeating. For Greece, Italy, Portugal and
Belgium, austerity measures planned would indeed require struc-
tural primary surpluses above 3% of GDP for many years, which
has rarely been achieved in history of fiscal consolidation. 
Besides, our simulations show that the long-run debt-to-GDP
ratio in many euro area countries is astonishingly low: 26% in
Germany, 18% in Italy, even 8% in Finland. There is no reason to
consider that this figure is consistent with preferences in these
countries notably because public bonds are highly demanded on
financial markets, especially "risk-free" bonds like German Bunds.
Consequently, this outcome questions the relevance of fiscal
austerity in these countries. The baseline scenario may then go too
far in terms of fiscal sustainability. To sum up, this scenario
considers fiscal restrictions that go beyond the requirements of
fiscal sustainability. Debt sustainability is a relative concept which
should not be assessed regardless of the cost of achieving it.
Consolidation also goes beyond the requirements of EU fiscal rules
– for a country under an excessive deficit procedure, the minimum
improvement in public finances per year is an increase of 0.5% in
the cyclically-adjusted balance – and, undoubtedly, beyond the
social resilience of European citizens. 
We introduce a first variant where we consider a strict imple-
mentation of current fiscal rules, and we compute a sequence of
fiscal impulses over 2015-2032 that allows to reach the 60% target
in each member state, assuming that fiscal impulses for the years
2013 to 2015 remain unchanged. Thus, we aim at gauging if all
countries can reach the public debt target in 2032. For countries
which already achieved this threshold, we implement positive fiscal
impulses after 2015 so that debt-to-GDP is equal to 60% in 2032.
For simplicity, we set fiscal impulses at -0.5 or +0.5 depending on
the gap vis-à-vis the target: the fiscal impulse is negative (resp. posi-
tive) if actual debt is above (resp. below) the target. The cumulated
fiscal impulse is larger than in the baseline scenario for countries
which cannot achieve 60% in this scenario, whereas it is lower for
the other countries. Comparisons between the baseline scenario
and this variant, based on structural balances and average annual
growth rates, indicate the costs or gains of sticking to the debt
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target at 20-year horizon in all countries. The question of fiscal
sustainability is crucial for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
since they do not reach this targeted debt level in the baseline
scenario, whereas the question of the costs of fiscal retrenchment
is crucial for countries which go beyond EU fiscal legislation
requirements in the baseline scenario. 
Results are reported in Table 3. Striking results are threefold.
First, two countries – Ireland and Greece – are still unable to achieve
the debt-to-GDP target. It does not preclude fiscal sustainability per
se, but it entails further social unsustainability of public finances:
the fiscal stance over 2013-2032 produces a cumulative fiscal
impulse which is highly negative and twice as high (in absolute
values) as in the baseline scenario. Such a fiscal stance is entirely
unrealistic and inefficient: economic growth in the medium-run
would be lowered substantially, and the maximum negative output
gap would be even larger. This outcome ensues from the high value
of the fiscal multiplier when the output gap is strongly negative,
from inertial processes in economic growth once hysteresis is intro-
duced, and from the relatively insufficient decrease in real interest
rates, since these two countries suffer from low or negative inflation
rates until 2020. 
Second, Spain and Portugal achieve the debt target in 2032, but
under substantially more restrictive fiscal stances. Fiscal adjust-
ment under such conditions seems unrealistic and unreasonable:
between 2013 and 2017, both countries would experience slower
economic growth than in the baseline, hence postponing until
2025 (Portugal) and 2027 (Spain) the return to a zero output gap.
Third, countries with public debt levels below the debt target in
2032 have fiscal leeway and then implement expansionary fiscal
policies:14 indeed, the cumulated fiscal impulse improves by
2.7 percentage points in Germany, 1 in France, 4.2 in Italy, 5.7 in
Finland and 1.4 in Austria in this variant compared to the baseline
scenario. Despite fiscal leeway and relatively high fiscal multipliers
in the short run, the net gain in terms of economic growth is
however very small. The reason lies in trade interactions within the
14. An alternative scenario would have been to suppose that these countries pursue a neutral
fiscal policy. But the difference with the scenario where they adopt expansionary fiscal policy to
reach the 60% in 2032 would have been very small.
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euro area: the margins for manoeuvre for some countries are offset
by the large real difficulties resulting from the implementation of a
more restrictive fiscal stance in Southern countries and Ireland.
Besides, countries that implement expansionary fiscal policies have
a small output gap. The fiscal multiplier is then lower.
4. No pain, more gain: the case for delaying consolidation
The previous results show unambiguously that fiscal consolida-
tion is costly. The output gap is strongly reduced by austerity and
in some countries it would reach record low levels. Besides, for all
euro area countries, it will take time to recover from the crisis since
the output gap would not close until 2020. This is the consequence
of past, current and future consolidation measures. But even coun-
tries that would reach the 60% debt ratio without additional fiscal
Table 3.  Can the 60% target be reached in 2032 and what are the costs
in terms of growth?
Public debt
 (% of GDP)
Structural balance
(% of GDP)
Cumulated 
fiscal 
impulse
(% of GDP)
Average 
annual 
growth
Maximum
negative 
output gap 
reached
2012 2017 2032 2012 2017 2032 2013-2032
2013-
2017
2018-
2032
2013- 
2032
Germany 82 68 60 0.3 -0.1 -1.8 2.4 1.5 1.3 -0.7
France 90 89 60 -1.4 -1.1 -0.8 -1.9  2.3 2.1 -6.8
Italy 127 109 60 0.3 1.4 0.4 2.1 1.8 1.4 -6.5
Spain 86 104 60 -3.7 -1.3 1.3 -8.2 1.3 2.2 -9.8
Netherlands 69 68 60 -2.9 -1.6 -1.9 -2.0 2.1 2.0 -2.8
Belgium 100 91 60 -0.9 -0.3 -0.6 -0.3 2.3 2.1 -4.3
Portugal 119 137 60 -2.8 -0.1 3.7 -8.2  0.4 1.8 -10.2
Ireland 118 144 71 -5.0 -1.7 5.2 -13.7  0.5 2.5 -11.0
Greece 177 206 84 -0.6 1.9 8.9 -15.5 -0.4 2.3 -17.3
Finland  53 46 60 0.2 0.1 -4.3 3.4 2.5 2.2 -1.9
Austria  75 69 60 -2.5 -1.2 -1.7 -0.5 1.8 1.6 -0.9
Euro area  94 89 61 -1.0 -0.3 -0.5 -1.0 1.7 1.8 -4.9
Sources: Eurostat, iAGS model.
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effort will be negatively affected by austerity implemented in other
countries.
The most negative consequences are borne by Spain, Portugal,
Greece and Ireland. These countries are those where the fiscal
multiplier is the highest. The cost of austerity is then amplified and
the effectiveness of consolidation, i.e. the ability to stick to the
objectives settled in the European fiscal rules, is reduced. There is
clearly a trade-off in the short term between economic growth and
debt and this trade-off strongly hinges on the value of the fiscal
multiplier. The higher the multiplier, the costlier consolidation
and the smaller the public debt decreases. This trade-off raises the
following question: is there an optimal situation where the same
objective for public debt ratios may be reached while reducing
output losses? If countries had the opportunity to delay austerity
measures, they would benefit from higher growth, but what would
be the consequences on debt? It is likely that the output gap would
close more rapidly, hence implying lower values for the fiscal
multiplier. By taking advantage of this time-varying feature of
multipliers, it would be possible to optimize the effectiveness of
fiscal consolidation. In order to compute such a variant, we seek
for each country separately the date at which it would be optimal
to start consolidation. This date may be different across countries
as it depends on the initial conditions. It must be stressed that for
each country, the simulations are done everything else equal and
notably given the fiscal impulses in the other countries. Optimiza-
tion is then partial as there may be feedback effects, which are
ignored here. Besides, we keep interest rates spreads constant rela-
tive to the baseline scenario. This is clearly a strong hypothesis as
part of the rise in sovereign yields spreads may be explained by fear
of default. Then, frontloading austerity was perceived as the only
way to convince financial markets that countries care about fiscal
sustainability. Yet, we advocate that delaying fiscal austerity
should go along with institutional arrangements ensuring that due
measures will be taken in the future. The case for constant spreads
may for example be warranted by the central bank playing the role
of lender of last resort for sovereigns.
We consider a (small, permanent and negative) fiscal impulse at
a certain year (and no fiscal impulse for any other year), and then
we run the model and calculate the decrease in the public debt-to-
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GDP ratio in 2032. This simulation is done at each date between
2013 and 2032 and for each country. The algorithm is simple: given
the assumption of a homogeneous initial debt-to-GDP ratio across
countries, given the timeframe for reducing debt to 60% of GDP
(20 years), and given a maximum fiscal impulse of Imax=±0.5, it is
possible to select the timing of the first fiscal impulse based on the
maximum efficiency of fiscal impulse. Figure 5 suggests that when
the fiscal multiplier is constant, austerity is more efficient (in terms
of debt reduction) when the negative fiscal impulse is done in the
first period (frontloading strategy). Implementing a 1 percentage
point fiscal impulse in 2013 would lead to decrease by nearly
20 percentage points the public debt-to-GDP ratio in 2032. When
the fiscal impulse is implemented in 2021, the debt ratio is only
11 percentage points lower in 2032 than in 2012. Since the fiscal
impulse is small, this is an approximation of the first derivative of
debt to GDP ratio 20 years from now relative to impulse in any year
from now. If the model is linear (no hysteresis and constant fiscal
multiplier), then, debt reduction is independent of initial condi-
tions and derivatives are independent of the size of the impulse.
Things get more complicated when we consider time-varying
multipliers, hysteresis effects and different initial conditions.
Figure 6 is based on a business cycle-dependent multiplier and
includes negative output gaps described above as initial conditions
to the system. In such a model and for given initial conditions,
multipliers are higher than a given critical value for which it is
equivalent to implement fiscal restriction now or one year later, for
a given amount of debt reduction. Thus postponing the negative
fiscal impulse by one year or more may be more efficient for debt
reduction (backloading strategy). For Germany where the output
gap was close to zero in 2012, there is no gain in postponing fiscal
consolidation. The maximum impact of consolidation is given
when consolidation starts in 2013. However, for Greece, starting
consolidation in 2013 gives poor results in terms of public debt
reduction. The output gap is indeed strongly negative and the
value of the fiscal multiplier is high. A fiscal impulse implemented
in 2013 would thus have a strong negative impact on output. The
negative feedback effect on the cyclical public deficit would miti-
gate the decrease in public debt. For Greece, a 1 percentage point
fiscal consolidation would decrease public debt in 2032 by less
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than 3 percentage points. The best year to start consolidation
would be 2017 as the fall in the public debt ratio would reach
nearly 13 percentage points in 2032. Using this algorithm for each
euro area country, we obtain the year when it is optimal to start
fiscal consolidation. 
Figure 5. Debt reduction in 2032 for a 1.0 fiscal impulse on a given year
Constant multiplier, no hysteresis
Figure 6. Debt reduction in 2032 for a 1.0 fiscal impulse on a given year,
non linear model
Cycle-dependent multiplier and hysteresis
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Following the dynamics shown on Figure 6, the afore-
mentioned algorithm states that fiscal impulses should not start in
2013 in most countries. The necessary sequence for debt reduction
would thus follow a pattern of no impulse before the inflexion date
and an impulse equal to Imax after the inflexion date, as long as
necessary to reduce debt to 60% of GDP in 2032. Table 4 indicates
the optimal date to start fiscal consolidation. 
It may happen – as we describe below – that the debt target
cannot be reached through this process. In this case, we compute
the Imax which would allow reaching the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio.
We show that in the case of a large negative output gap, post-
ponement is more effective to reduce public debt, because of the
high current value of the fiscal multiplier. Accordingly, we find
that there are 6 countries where it would be better to delay consoli-
dation (Table 4). The effectiveness of consolidation would be
increased in so far as time would be given for growth to recover.
Such a strategy implicitly boils down to a 2-step approach. It
stresses that it is first needed to let the cyclically-adjusted deficit be
reduced in line with the closing of the output gap. Once the output
gap is closed, it becomes more effective to undertake fiscal consoli-
dation per se, i.e. the requested reduction of the structural deficit.
Thus, for Greece, it would be more effective to start consolidation
in 2017. For France, Spain and Ireland, it would be better to imple-
ment a neutral fiscal policy until 2016. Finally, for the Netherlands
and Portugal, debt reduction would be optimized if consolidation
started in 2015.
Comparing Table 4 to Table 2, we show that delaying fiscal
consolidation leads to a higher average growth in 2013-2017 in
concerned countries, and also for the euro area as a whole (2.4%
for 2013-2017, against 1.7% without delaying the adjustment).
Greece is again the country which would benefit the most from
delaying fiscal consolidation. Yearly average growth would be
4.5 percentage points higher between 2013 and 2017. Then, as the
output gap would close more rapidly, the average growth would be
slightly lower from 2018 to 2032. It must be stressed again that
postponing consolidation in these simulations would lead to
achieve the same debt target, relatively to the situation where
consolidation is only spread over time, with a cumulated fiscal
impulse that would be only half as large. This is extensively
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explained by the cycle-dependent multiplier, which makes
austerity less painful since it is postponed until the multiplier
reaches a lower value. Considering this argument, we may also
argue that forward looking financial markets would also consider
that it is more efficient to consolidate later. Then, if they worry
about fiscal sustainability and public debt default, it is not clear
whether interest rate spreads would necessarily increase. Further-
more, it may be needed to enforce the credibility of postponed
austerity by appropriate institutional arrangements. The ECB
should notably play a crucial role. As reminded by De Grauwe
(2012), countries in monetary union are more prone to speculative
attacks, which strengthens the argument for central banks in
monetary union being lender of last resort for sovereigns. Simi-
larly, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland combine a gain of 0.5 to
0.6 percentage point of growth on average over the same period
Table 4. Is it more appropriate to postpone the start of fiscal adjustment?
Public debt
 (% of GDP)
Structural balance
(% of GDP)
Cumu-
lated 
fiscal 
impulse
(% of 
GDP)
Average 
annual growth
Maximum
negative 
output 
gap 
reached
Starting 
date 
of fiscal 
impulses 
(sign 
of FI)
2012 2017 2032 2012 2017 2032 2013-2032
2013-
2017
2018-
2032
2013-
2032
Germany 82 74 60 0.3 -1.3 -1.1 1.6 1.6 1.3 -0.7 2013 (+)
France 90 86 60 -1.4 -1.2 -0.8 -1.1  2.8 2.1 -4.0 2016 (-)
Italy 127 107 60 0.3 -0.7 1.3 1.9  2.4 1.3 -3.0 2013 (+)
Spain 86 95 60 -3.7 -4.0 2.4 -7.3  3.1 1.9 -5.7 2016 (-)
Nether-
lands 69 72 60 -2.9 -2.1 -1.6 -2.1 2.3 2.0 -2.1 2015 (-)
Belgium 100 90 60 -0.9 -1.3 -0.5 0.1  2.7 2.0 -3.2 2013 (+)
Portugal 119 116 60 -2.8 -1.7 1.9 -3.3  2.4 1.6 -3.3 2015 (-)
Ireland 118 123 78 -5.0 -5.1 2.7 -8.0  3.2 2.2 -4.7 2016 (-)
Greece 177 141 60 -0.6 -0.3 2.8 -1.5 4.1 1.9 -7.1 2017 (-)
Finland  53 56 60 0.2 -2.3 -2.8 1.8 2.6 2.2 -1.3 2013 (+)
Austria  75 72 60 -2.5 -1.6 -1.4 -0.9 1.7 1.6 -0.9 2013 (-)
Euro area  94 88 60 -1.0 -1.6 -0.1 -0.7 2.4 1.7 -2.9
Sources : Eurostat, iAGS model.
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when they delay fiscal consolidation and implement a bigger cut
in their structural deficit. For France, average growth would be
0.2 percentage point higher compared to the situation where
consolidation is spread over time. This improvement would stem
from the better prospects of trade partners within the euro area. It
remains to be said that this mild improvement would give a net
gain of 0.5 percentage point in comparison with the baseline situa-
tion where the French government sticks to its current fiscal
commitments.
For Austria and Germany, the second variant would not entail
significantly less consolidation. On the one hand, those countries
would benefit from a stronger growth in the rest of the euro area.
But, on the other hand, interest rates would be higher as a result of
a relative tightening of monetary policy, through the Taylor rule.
For Germany, real interest rates would on average amount to 1.7%
when consolidation is delayed in all other euro area countries
against 1% in the scenario where current commitments are
fulfilled.
5. Conclusion
Drawing on a reduced-form model of most euro area member
states, we assess the costs of the frontloaded strategy endorsed by
governments, under the auspices of the European Commission, in
terms of economic growth and also in terms of fiscal sustainability.
Beyond clarifying the failure of this strategy, we discuss an alterna-
tive scenario built upon simulations based on the same reduced-
form model. We suggest that keeping a debt ratio target of 60% by
2032 and postponing fiscal consolidation would be almost
optimal. As a matter of fact, in most countries, long-term sustain-
ability of public finances would be fulfilled while in the short run,
economic growth would be higher.
The reduced-form model, though it departs from optimal
control modelling, includes major features of the so-called New
Consensus (New Classical) school: (partly) forward-looking expec-
tations by consumers, firms and financial markets, a Taylor rule to
describe monetary policy setting, the introduction of risk premia
on public or private bonds, reliance on the disputable concept of
“output gap” and a zero-lower-bound to describe non-linear mone-
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tary policy. Despite the similarity of our model with some models
used in large international institutions like the European Commis-
sion, we achieve new results as regards the appropriate pace of
fiscal consolidation in the euro area. Two assumptions are
important: fiscal multipliers vary along the business cycle, in
accordance with an abundant literature which we review, and
hysteresis effects maintain the real GDP fall vis-à-vis its potential.
The introduction of a delayed consolidation in the euro area
certainly goes beyond the letter of the European treaties; neverthe-
less, this backloading strategy would significantly alleviate the
social consequences of the crisis as it would reduce unemploy-
ment. For this strategy to be fully effective, a strong commitment
by governments to reduce debt-to-GDP ratios in the future is a
necessity: debt reduction must be planned, but only once the
output gap has substantially decreased, therefore limiting the costs
of consolidation. Governments should pay attention to the size of
fiscal multipliers and to the level of the output gap or the unem-
ployment rate before implementing restrictive fiscal policies.
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Appendix : Main hypotheses for the baseline simulations
Simulations begin in 2013. To do so, we need to set some
starting point values in 2012 for a set of determinant variables.
Output gaps for 2012 come from ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts.
Potential growth for the baseline potential GDP is based on
Johansson et al. (2012) projections (see Table A1). Concerning
fiscal policy and budget variables, the main hypotheses are as
follows:
— The public debt in 2012 comes from the European Commis-
sion’s autumn 2012 forecast;
— We use the ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts for fiscal balances in
2012; 
— We use the European Commission’s autumn 2012 forecast of
interest expenditures for 2012; combined with ECLM-IMK-OFCE
forecasts of output gaps in 2012, and model estimates of the
cyclical part of the fiscal balance, it gives the structural primary
balance for 2012;
— Fiscal impulses come from ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts for
2013 (Table A2). For 2014-2015, we use fiscal impulses implied by
the Stability and Growth Pact reported in the “Assessment of the
2012 national reform programme and stability programme” for
each country.
— Sovereign spreads come from ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts for
2013-2015 (see Table A3). We made the hypothesis that the ECB
programme of unlimited debt buying on the secondary market
(Outright Monetary Transactions) is effective and achieves its goal
to bring down interest rates for Italy and Spain. Regarding coun-
tries relying on the ESM for debt financing, we assume that Ireland
will get direct access to financial markets as of 2014, Portugal as of
2015 and Greece as of 2016.    
